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Abstract 12 
Informal settlements are home to approximately one billion people globally and are growing 13 
due to rapid urbanisation in less economically developed countries. Their dense layouts, often 14 
combined with light, combustible building materials make them highly vulnerable to fires.  In 15 
some cases fires have spread through hundreds or thousands of homes in a single fire, 16 
rendering the inhabitants homeless. Tackling this issue requires a sound understanding of the 17 
many spatial factors which can contribute to fire spread between individual dwellings and 18 
into the wider settlement. This paper presents initial methods for assessing and quantifying 19 
fire risk in informal settlements due to a variety of spatial factors in the case of Cape Town, 20 
South Africa – a city which has a notable history of devastating informal settlement fires. GIS 21 
techniques were used to obtain data to build a model for the quantification of risk imposed by 22 
the settlement layout with respect to three key metrics; dwelling spacing, edge density and 23 
critical patch size. The results of the risk model and data of past fires suggest that the 24 
settlement layout is a critical factor in determining the ability of large fires to establish within 25 
a settlement. A framework for additional infrastructural and environmental risk is also 26 
presented, identifying the need for a wide-ranging interdisciplinary approach to the problem 27 
of urban fires. 28 
Keywords: informal settlements; fire risk; GIS analysis 29 
1 Introduction 30 
Informal settlements – which may also commonly be known as slums, shanty towns or 31 
favelas – are home to approximately 1 billion people globally [1]. Though the percentage of 32 
population living in these settlements is decreasing, absolute figures continue to grow, with 33 
estimates suggesting there will be 1.2 billion people living in informal settlements in Africa 34 
alone by 2050 [1]. These settlements have a particular vulnerability to fire. In recent years, 35 
individual informal settlement fires have rendered many thousands homeless, including 9,700 36 
in Imizamo Yethu, Cape Town [2], 15,000 in Manila [3] – both in 2017 – and a reported 37 
10,000 in Chalantika, Dhaka in 2019 [4]. Clear-up and rebuilding from the single 2017 38 
Imizamo Yethu fire has cost an estimated $8 million to date [2]. 39 
At the level of an individual informal dwelling, it has been shown experimentally that a fire 40 
can grow to involve the full dwelling in less than 90 seconds [5], with burnout and collapse 41 
occurring in as little as 2-5 minutes [6]. Recent tests have also shown that from the point of 42 
flashover in one dwelling, a fire can spread to, and reach flashover in, two subsequent 43 
dwellings in as little as 4 minutes [7]. This represents an extremely rapid fire development 44 
 
 
when compared with a typical compartment fire in the formal built environment, and is a 45 
significant danger to residents.  46 
However, the potential for a fire to develop from single dwelling or a small cluster of dwellings 47 
to the scale of an entire settlement is currently poorly quantified. Statistics available for fires 48 
in Cape Town over the period 2009-2015 show that the average fire extended to less than 7 49 
dwellings [8]. Yet, the city’s informal settlements still experienced at least one fire involving 50 
20 or more dwellings per week on average [9]. There is a clear discrepancy between daily small 51 
fires and the less-frequent large fires which can destroy hundreds of homes. 52 
Dwellings are usually crude structures, with a timber frame and cladding built from 53 
corrugated steel sheeting, plastic sheeting or timber [5,6,10]. Residents may insulate their 54 
homes by adding internal cardboard or timber board, and reduce permeability of the walls by 55 
stuffing any holes with paper.  56 
The combination of readily combustible materials, lack of space between dwellings and 57 
exposure to high winds is predicted to contribute to fire spread through a settlement in a 58 
manner similar to wildfire spread [5]. Intuitively, settlement density – in terms of dwellings 59 
per area – has been postulated as determining the severity of fires, but, taken independently 60 
from other factors, has shown only a very weak correlation with fire size [11]. Given the 61 
scale of these fires, it is difficult to test these factors experimentally. Yet, better 62 
understanding is required to establish how and why such large fires can occur, and to 63 
implement mitigation strategies.  64 
GIS-based analysis can play a vital role in this by helping to formulate risk quantification 65 
techniques to compare settlements against one another. GIS-based methods are commonplace 66 
in previous fire risk quantification studies in the field of both urban fire [12–15] and wildfire 67 
[16–19]. However, the complexity of quantifying informal settlement fire risk is exactly that 68 
these fires may exhibit characteristics of both standard compartment fire dynamics and 69 
wildfire dynamics. No studies have yet made the connection between the two. Existing urban 70 
GIS based fire-risk analyses in non-informal contexts justifiably tend to neglect the 71 
possibility of fire spread between buildings. Thus, a new conceptualisation of fire risk is 72 
required for informal settlements. 73 
Informal settlements are predominantly found in low- and middle- income countries, where 74 
reliable data sources are often not easily accessible or in some cases lacking. Cape Town has 75 
been selected as a case study due to the availability of fairly reliable GIS data [8,20] and the 76 
fact that the founding studies concerning informal settlement fires address it in the South 77 
African context [2,5–7,11,21]. This paper presents the case of Cape Town’s informal 78 
settlements and the role of a high resolution digitised dwelling footprint dataset in 79 
establishing the foundation of risk quantification for informal settlements. It proposes a 80 
simple multiplicative risk model to quantify fire risk presented by the layout of dwellings 81 
within a settlement. It also establishes a framework into which other risk factors can be built 82 
in light of future work, acknowledging that current understanding of the fundamental fire 83 
dynamics in informal settlement fires is not fully developed. 84 
2 Method 85 
As noted, the number of dwellings in a given area does not necessarily correlate strongly to 86 
the potential for severe fires as initially studied by Smith [11]. It is proposed that more 87 
rigorous methods of quantification can contribute to better understanding of the present fire 88 
risk. The method applied by Smith does not necessarily infer any information about how 89 
 
 
dwellings are spaced and grouped together within a settlement. These are factors which are 90 
key to understanding fire spread and, with good quality GIS data, can be easily quantified. 91 
This work made use of an existing high resolution (±8cm), manually-digitised GIS dataset of 92 
informal dwelling footprints in the City of Cape Town [dataset] [22]. Three metrics are 93 
proposed below to quantify risk, developed from the data and intended to quantify specific 94 
characteristics of a settlement’s layout. These metrics were calculated for the 291 distinct 95 
‘informal settlement areas’ (ISAs) across Cape Town as contained in the dataset. All three 96 
metrics are aimed at quantifying spatial characteristics of the layout of dwellings within 97 
settlements. At this stage the inclusion of additional environmental and infrastructural metrics 98 
faces a gap in knowledge and data as discussed in Section 4, and would thus be unreliable to 99 
include currently. The calculation of metrics and subsequent production of non-dimensional 100 
risk scores (X) for each ISA was conducted using the following theory and methods. 101 
2.1 Average minimum distance to nearest neighbour 102 
Fire is enabled to spread if dwellings are within a sufficient proximity, predominantly due to 103 
radiative heat transfer and direct flame impingement. Generally, the closer a dwelling is to an 104 
adjacent fire, the quicker it will ignite, though the time to ignition is also governed by the 105 
incident heat flux and the orientation of the dwelling towards the fire. The overall model for 106 
radiative heat transfer given in Drysdale [24] implies the relationship between incident 107 
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This forms a very basic foundation for the rate of fire spread between adjacent informal 112 
dwellings. For informal settlement fires, the distance between dwellings and the distance of 113 
radiative heat transfer are not equal since there will be a plume of flames projected from any 114 
vents – open windows or doorways – in the dwelling. This plume may directly impinge the 115 
edge of an adjacent dwelling if it is in sufficient proximity, but primarily adds to the thermal 116 
radiation emitted by the burning dwelling. The extent to which this plume protrudes from the 117 
burning dwelling varies with the size and shape of the opening from which it flows, as well as 118 
if there is any wind-assisted through draft. The effects of these on risk are complex but Wang 119 
et al. model simplified relationships for scenarios with no through draft [25]. These suggest 120 
the incident heat flux experienced by an adjacent dwelling is at a constant maximum up to 121 
0.6-1.3m from the burning dwelling depending on opening characteristics, dropping as an 122 
inverse square function to effectively 0 kW/m2 at some distance from the dwelling. A 123 
thermally thin model has been selected due to the prevalence of thermally thin lining 124 
materials as discussed earlier, but this does not guarantee that in a real fire a thermally thin 125 
material will always be the point of ignition. However, Drysdale’s corresponding model for 126 
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Thus, using the thermally thin model provides a conservative quantification of risk. 128 
In real fires, the specific location of the vent on the wall of the dwelling will determine which 129 
adjacent dwellings will be exposed to the flame plume, and how far they will be from the 130 
plume. However, vent locations cannot be detected remotely by satellite imagery. This is 131 
potentially problematic as it cannot necessarily be assumed that there will always be vents in 132 
locations that are always at either the closest or furthest points between two dwellings. 133 
Nevertheless, across a settlement in which dwellings are consistently close to their 134 
neighbours on average, it is assumed that proportionally more vents will be in close 135 
proximity to neighbouring dwellings than in a settlement where dwellings are not as 136 
consistently close together. 137 
Under specific experimental conditions a material can be found to have a critical heat flux for 138 
ignition. If a design fire is known or estimated, this critical heat flux can contribute to the 139 
conceptualisation of a critical distance for ignition. In simple terms this is the maximum 140 
distance the material can be from a fire at which it will ignite. Wang et al. investigated this 141 
theory in relation to informal dwellings in Cape Town [25] and proposed a critical distance 142 
for ignition of as much as 3.3m if there are polyurethane-type materials exposed. 143 
The proposed metric, ‘average minimum distance to nearest neighbour’ (Sp), is calculated by 144 
finding the minimum distance between each dwelling and its nearest neighbouring dwelling 145 
in the dataset, and then averaging the values for all the dwellings in each ISA (Figure 1).  146 
 147 
Figure 1:Method for finding the set of minimum distances from each dwelling to its nearest neighbour (NN), from which the 148 
metric ‘Sp’ is calculated 149 
This metric simply conceptualises how fast a fire will be able to spread from the average 150 
dwelling in an ISA to its nearest neighbour, regardless of how many other dwellings it has the 151 
capability of spreading to. In accordance with the dimensional limits proposed by Wang, et 152 
al. for no through-draft conditions [25] it is therefore proposed that risk associated with 153 
dwelling spacing is at a maximum if the average minimum distance to nearest neighbour 154 
across all dwellings in an ISA (Sp) is less than 0.6m, and at a minimum if the average is over 155 
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2.2 Edge density 157 
‘Edge density’ is a term that is used in many fields of work with varied definitions and 158 
applications. However, there are few, if any, instances of it being applied in any studies 159 
relating specifically to fire. In this context, it simply means the total length of dwelling edges 160 
per area of settlement, and was calculated accordingly (ρd). Currently, it is assumed that for 161 
an area of dwellings, a higher edge density implies more points from and to which a fire can 162 
spread. However, this does require more research in future. It could be possible that very high 163 
edge densities mean that the fire is more sheltered from any effects of wind. Furthermore, it is 164 
possible that, at increasing edge densities, the higher number of iterative ‘jumps’ between 165 
dwellings that a fire has to make results in slower overall fire spread.   166 
Fundamentally, the concept of edge density, in this case, attempts to quantify the multi-167 
directionality of possible fire spread from the average point in an ISA. The associated risk is 168 
modelled as a linear relationship with respect to the maximum value as calculated across all 169 
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2.3 Weighted average critical patch size 171 
Whilst dwelling spacing and edge density may dictate the speed and multi-directionality of 172 
fire spread, the extent of spread should be limited by the size of the ‘critical patch’ in which 173 
the fire occurs. The critical patch is defined as the group of dwellings that all lie within a 174 
given critical distance of ignition of at least one other dwelling in the group. In theory, given 175 
unlimited time in the absence of external pressures (wind, firefighting etc.), a fire that 176 
originates anywhere in the patch should spread to all other dwellings within the patch, but no 177 
further. 178 
 179 
Figure 2: Method for producing critical patches using a 1.65m buffer, showing a group of eight dwellings resolves into two 180 
‘critical patches’ 181 
Again utilising the theory of critical distance, a set of critical patches was produced. All 182 
dwelling footprints were buffered out – that is to say, their boundaries were offset outwards 183 
 
 
in all directions – by 1.65m, so that the buffered dwellings would overlap if they were within 184 
3.3m of each other. The critical distance of 3.3m is as per Wang et al. [25]. These 185 
overlapping buffered boundaries were then joined to create larger ‘critical patches’, which 186 
were subsequently buffered back by 1.65m so the extent of the patch was the outermost edge 187 
of the outermost dwellings in the patch. This process is shown in Figure 2. This approach 188 
assumes that polyurethane-type materials are present in all dwellings and so is a conservative 189 
calculation (for further discussion see 4.1.2). The weighted average area (Aav) of all resultant 190 
patches (Ap,i) across each ISA, where there are n patches in the ISA, was calculated: 191 
 






A weighted average is proposed rather than a simple mean because the patch size indicates 192 
both the amount of ‘connected’ fuel and the probability that a fire is initially located in that 193 
patch (assuming the probability of ignition in any given dwelling is equal). It is necessary to 194 
use a weighted average to fully account for high risk that is present in ISAs with very large 195 
critical patches but also many isolated dwellings and smaller patches. For example, the ISA 196 
Monwabisi Park B has one critical patch of 91,600 m2 but also many isolated dwellings. This 197 
results in a weighted average patch area of 71,000m2 but a simple mean area of only 138m2. 198 
This relatively tiny mean is clearly not reflective of the extent through which a fire could 199 
burn in the largest patch. 200 
The risk associated with critical patch size is modelled as a linear relationship relative to the 201 
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2.4 Multiplicative model 203 
Together these three metrics conceptualise risk associated with the average speed, multi-204 
directionality and possible extent of fire spread across all points in an ISA. A simple 205 
multiplicative risk model is proposed to quantify the overall risk presented by a settlement’s 206 
layout: 207 
 𝑋 = 𝑋 𝑋 𝑋  (9) 
The final rankings and corresponding GIS dataset are available at [dataset] [26].  208 
3 Analysis 209 
Across the 291 ISAs that were evaluated for fire spread risk, the maximum risk score (Xtot) 210 
was 0.452, achieved by the Siyahlala – Du Noon ISA. For the purposes of comparing the risk 211 
model results with fire history data, the full set of risk scores were normalised with respect to 212 








Normalising the data provides a means by which these risk scores can be mapped to similarly 214 
normalised quantitative data on the size of past fires. The City of Cape Town municipality 215 
collected fire incidence data over the period 2009-2015, and gave each informal settlement 216 
fire a grid reference by its location [8]. The full dataset comprises 401 1km × 1km grid 217 
 
 
squares (Figure 3). Using this data, the average fire size – by number of dwellings destroyed 218 
per fire incident – was calculated, with a maximum value of 70.77 dwellings.  219 
 220 
Figure 3 - Average fire size in number of dwellings destroyed per fire, from City of Cape Town fire incidence data for 2009-221 
2015 222 








Finally, sorting the ISAs and fire incidence areas by their ranks and normalising these ranks, 224 




Figure 4: Normalised ranked distributions of 291 ISAs by multiplicative risk score, and 401 fire history data points by 227 
average fire sized 228 
There are several reasons why direct numerical comparison or a regression model were not 229 
possible with the fire incidence data. Primarily this was due to the coarse mapping of the data 230 
to grid squares on a scale much larger than individual ISAs, so it could not be reliably 231 
attributed to specific settlements in all cases. Nevertheless, a clear trend is identifiable across 232 
both the risk model data and the fire incidence data: a very small number of settlements are 233 
responsible for the majority of large fires. In terms of risk, a minority of settlements contain 234 
the majority of fire risk. 235 
3.1 Verifying risk 236 
The predicted fire risk of selected highest ranked settlements can be compared with media 237 
reports of several large fires over the last decade (Table 1). The location of these settlements 238 
– and others that will be discussed – is given in Figure 5. 239 
Table 1: Comparison of a selection of ISAs by risk model rank and past fire incidents 240 
 241 
The risk model, though simplistic, appears to very quickly identify settlements which exhibit 242 
the potential for fire to spread to hundreds of dwellings. This is due to these settlements 243 






BM Section 4th  BM Section, 
Khayelitsha 
800 dwellings, 3000 homeless (2013) [27] 
Kosovo 5th  Kosovo 120 dwellings, 1400 displaced (2018) [28] 
Dontshiyake 7th  Imizamo Yethu 2194 dwellings, 9700 homeless (2017) [2] 
Wetlands 12th  Masiphumelele 1000 dwellings, 4000 homeless (2015) [5], 
256 dwellings, 1000 homeless (2019) [29] 
Doornbach 19th  Doornbach (Du 
Noon) 
100 dwellings, 500 displaced (2018) [30] 
 
 
ranking highly in all three of the proposed metrics. However, even among these high risk 244 
settlements there are large discrepancies in the size of past fires, ranging from 100-2000+ 245 
dwellings. Reasons for this are discussed in Section 4. 246 
 247 
Figure 5: Selected ISAs – extents and their geographical locations 248 
There are settlements which are ranked highly by the risk model that do not appear to have 249 
recently experienced any notably large fires. In some cases, whilst there are no media reports 250 
to suggest large fires, the high fire risk can be corroborated by the fire incidence data. For 251 
example, in addition to the 2018 Doornbach fire (Table 1), the Du Noon group of informal 252 
settlements experienced 59 fires with a total of 1163 destroyed dwellings at an average of 253 
almost 20 per fire from 2009-2015. The Du Noon cluster includes several smaller, low risk-254 
ranked ISAs but notably also includes the ISAs Siyahlala - Du Noon; Doornbach; and 255 
Ekuphumleni - Du Noon 3, ranked 1st, 18th and 19th by the risk model respectively. It would 256 
be reasonable to expect that these ISAs account for the particularly high average fire size in 257 
the Du Noon area. 258 
There are also settlements which are ranked highly by the model, yet have no corresponding 259 
media reports of large fires or notable evidence of large fires in the fire incidence data. 260 
Particularly prominent examples include BT Section and DT Section 1, both in Khayelitsha, 261 
 
 
ranking 2nd and 3rd for risk respectively. This would indicate that either the physical 262 
development of the settlements time that has brought them to a high risk status have 263 
happened fairly recently, or that they have simply been fortunate to experience ignitions at 264 
times when there have not been prime conditions for fire spread (see Section 124). However, 265 
both settlements have similar spatial properties (XA, XSp and Xρ) to other large ISAs in the 266 
Khayelitsha region, notably 4th ranked BM Section which experienced an 800 dwelling fire in 267 
2013 (Table 1). This suggests that these settlements have a spatial arrangement of dwellings 268 
sufficient for the spread of large fires. Indeed , another Khayelitsha ISA, 30th ranked 269 
Silvertown (𝑋 = 1, 𝑋 = 0.540), is compositionally very similar to DT Section 1 (𝑋 =270 
1, 𝑋 = 0.587), and, despite being smaller, experienced a fire that destroyed 200 dwellings 271 
and displaced 4000 people in 2018 [31]. This highlights the fact that, whilst a settlement that 272 
has no apparent history of large fires, it may still be highly capable of allowing the 273 
development of large fires. 274 
It can also be observed that ISAs which rank highly in one or two of the metrics will not 275 
necessarily rank highly for risk overall. This can also be compared against fire history with 276 
two key examples (both identified in Figure 5). 277 
3.1.1 Monwabisi Park B 278 
This ISA has been mentioned already due to it having the maximum weighted average critical 279 
patch size (i.e. 𝑋 = 1). With one single critical patch of 91,600m2 – resulting in a weighted 280 
average of 71,000m2 – it would certainly seems that there is potential for the development of 281 
a very large fire. However, no media reports were identified that give any evidence of large 282 
fires here. Furthermore, the ISA lies exclusively within the spatial bounds of fire incidence 283 
data that indicates the average fire size is no more than 2.4 dwellings. This would suggest that 284 
the low edge density (𝑋 = 0.333) and average dwelling spacing (𝑋 = 0.194) contribute to 285 
an environment in which no fire has yet been able to spread fast enough in multiple directions 286 
for a mass conflagration. By the risk model, Monwabisi Park B ranks 78th for risk.  287 
3.1.2 Thabo Mbeki 288 
Thabo Mbeki settlement is composed of two ISAs. Both Thabo Mbeki East (𝑋 = 1) and 289 
Thabo Mbeki West (𝑋 = 0.903) scored highly for risk associated with dwelling spacing, 290 
but neither scored highly for patch size or edge density ( 291 
Table 2). This is indicative of a settlement with multiple smaller groups of dwellings spaced 292 
close together but no dominant critical patch to enable extensive fire spread. The ISAs 293 
overlay two fire incidence grid areas of average fire size 1.2 and 2.4 dwellings, indicating the 294 
average fire size for Thabo Mbeki is of a similar size. Past fires identifiable in media reports 295 
corroborate this, with individual reported incidents burning 2 and 7 dwellings each [32,33]. 296 
The two sections of the settlements are ranked 46th and 69th by the model, respectively. 297 
ISA Risk Model 
Rank 
Normalised Risk Score (X) 
A Sp ρ 
Monwabisi Park B 78th  1 0.194 0.333 
Thabo Mbeki East 46th 0.237 1 0.492 
Thabo Mbeki West 69th  0.161 0.903 0.492 
ISA Risk Model 
Rank 
Normalised Risk Score (X) 
A Sp ρ 
Monwabisi Park B 78th  1 0.194 0.333 
Thabo Mbeki East 46th 0.237 1 0.492 
 
 
Table 2: Normalised component risk scores for selected ISAs 298 
 299 
3.2 Large fire capability 300 
Whilst this method is entirely based on quantifying risk rather than numerical modelling of 301 
fire spread, it clearly identifies the tendency for a limited number of fires to develop into 302 
large conflagrations due to settlement layout. It is proposed that there reaches a critical point 303 
in the layout, as quantified by the risk model, where a mass conflagration is possible. This 304 
behaviour can be viewed as a structure of conditions, namely that there is a high risk of large 305 
fire development in a settlement if, 306 
1. the average dwelling is close enough to at least one neighbour to promote rapid fire 307 
spread, particularly if it is close enough for direct flame impingement (𝑋 = 1), 308 
2. And there is a multiplicity of pathways (𝑋 → 1) to allow many of these dwelling-to-309 
dwelling interactions to occur at once, 310 
3. And there is a large enough critical patch to allow the fire to grow to a size in which 311 
the dominant mechanisms of fire spread become less dependant on individual 312 
dwelling-to-dwelling interactions. 313 
The key condition here is Condition 3 since the fundamental dynamics concerning this shift 314 
in spread mechanisms are not yet known, they are merely proposed based on observations 315 
that large fires in informal settlements exhibit wildfire-type spread [5]. In basic terms, it is 316 
hypothesised that, in the right circumstances, a fire transitions from burning as discrete 317 
blocks of fuel (the individual dwellings) to burning as if in a semi-continuous bed of fuel.  318 
It is difficult to recommend a specific point of criticality in terms of the risk model. Rather, 319 
the criticality may be better defined by a transitional zone (Figure 4), in which a fire in an 320 
ISA with ‘transitional risk’ would not be expected to develop wildfire-type characteristics if 321 
left alone, but may do so under the influence of a variety of other spatial risk factors as 322 
discussed in Section 4.  323 
3.3 Objective limits of risk 324 
The risk model can be reverse engineered to establish what conditions physically constitute 325 
the concept of ‘high risk’. This is important given the metric values for settlements will 326 
change over time as they grow or densify. As such, the maximum reference values for patch 327 
size and edge density will change, altering the basis of the entire model. Real, physical limits 328 
of risk are proposed so that, in future, risk can be defined objectively. Intuitively, the highest 329 
ranked ISAs have an average minimum distance to nearest neighbour of less than 0.6m (i.e. 330 
within the distance for flame impingement even in the absence of wind), with the first to 331 
exceed this ranked at 54th by the model (Figure 6). 332 




Figure 6: Variation of average minimum distance to nearest neighbour (Sp) with risk score, showing proposed objective 334 
limit of risk and highlighting settlements where Sp≤2m 335 
Observationally, the top 50 settlements all have weighted critical patch areas of at least 336 
10,000m2 (1 ha) and edge densities of at least 0.3m-1 (Figure 7). It could therefore be 337 
proposed that settlements are objectively at high risk if they conform to these three limits, 338 
however these should be applied with caution outside of the specific context of Cape Town 339 
prior to further research. 340 
 341 
Figure 7: Variation of (a) Edge density and (b) Weighted average critical patch size with risk score, showing proposed 342 
objective limits of risk 343 
4 Wider framework of fire risk 344 
The basic layout of a settlement, quantifiable by the above risk model, establishes if that 345 
settlement is capable of sustaining a large conflagration. However, there are additional factors 346 
that can contribute to the overall outcome of a fire. It is proposed that settlements are, in fact, 347 
subject to three sources or layers of risk – the layout and composition of the settlement, the 348 
provision and quality of infrastructure, and the natural environment. Each of these layers is 349 
composed of several distinct spatial features (Table 3).  350 
Table 3: Spatial fire risk factors by category 351 










Proximity to fire stations 







Quantifying how these factors may contribute to fire risk is complex, due to lack of 353 
understanding, or lack of data that is of sufficient quality and resolution. Yet, they contribute 354 
to the overall spatial context of any given fire so they must be considered. As will be 355 
discussed, however, it can be difficult to fully dissociate the additional risk imposed by these 356 
factors from the internal layout of the settlement. 357 
4.1 Layout and Composition 358 
4.1.1 Fuel Load 359 
The actual fuel that is burning must be acknowledged when discussing fire risk, however 360 
quantifying the risk imposed upon the wider settlement is challenging. Firstly, the degree of 361 
variability of fuel load in individual dwellings is high. One estimate in South Africa puts the 362 
fuel load at 410MJ/m2 with a 140MJ/m2 standard deviation [34], but this figure may be as 363 
high as 2000MJ/m2 if residents are storing fuels, firewood or tyres in their home [5]. 364 
Quantifying this remotely is challenging, and visiting even a single settlement to obtain data 365 
would be time consuming. Furthermore, the effect of fuel load partly depends on the layout 366 
of the settlement. The fuel load will determine how long an individual dwelling burns, but not 367 
how fast the fire can spread. Spread rate is heavily dependent on dwelling spacing. Data from 368 
experimental tests with dwellings spaced at 1m showed that fire spread between dwellings 369 
tended to occur approximately 2-4 minutes prior to the burning dwelling collapsing [7] (and 370 
collapse does not necessarily mean all fuel has been consumed). Fundamentally, the impact 371 
of fuel load decreases as dwelling spacing decreases. At greater dwelling spacings, a low fuel 372 
load may mean a dwelling burns out before the fire can spread, but in such a situation the fire 373 
spread is likely to be slow in the absence of wind, so risk is already not particularly high. 374 
4.1.2 Building materials 375 
Building materials play a dual role in informal settlement fires. They contribute fuel in 376 
addition to the contents of the dwelling, thus influencing its burn time. However, more 377 
importantly, since the building materials form the exterior of the dwelling, they are generally 378 
the first point of ignition in dwelling-to-dwelling fire spread. This is a complex issue beyond 379 
the scope of this paper but readers are referred to Cicione et al. [7] for more detail. The use of 380 
the critical distance from Wang et al. [25] as a metric for calculating risk imposed by both 381 
dwelling spacing (𝑋 ) and patch size (𝑋 ) relied on the assumed presence of plastic 382 
materials, but the critical distance is reduced, in theory, if there are no plastics present. 383 
Similar to fuel load, obtaining the necessary data for this would be time consuming and 384 
difficult to do remotely. Using a critical distance of 3.3m [25] provides a conservative, worst 385 
case, estimate of risk.  386 
4.1.3 Settlement shape 387 
It is also proposed that the shape of a settlement may have some bearing on the outcome of a 388 
fire. When a fire reaches an adequate boundary its progress can be easily stopped. A suitable 389 
boundary might be imposed by obstructions such as a road or vacant land. The 2015 390 
Masiphumelele fire was stopped at wild land at the edges of the settlement and a canal [5] 391 
and the 2017 Imizamo Yethu fire had reached the upper edge, before the wind changed 392 
 
 
direction and drove the fire back into the settlement [2]. If the wind direction had not 393 
changed, the fire may have been able to move into vegetation at the boundary, but it would 394 
have at least moved out of, and beyond, any inhabited land. Generally, if a settlement has a 395 
high proportion of impassable boundaries compared to the area of the settlement, there is a 396 
good chance the fire will reach a boundary and be stopped. However, more work is needed to 397 
be able to quantify this for several reasons. Primarily, what constitutes an impassable 398 
boundary is not yet fully defined, and is difficult to identify remotely. Furthermore, the effect 399 
of settlement size in relation to settlement shape has also not been investigated. In a real fire, 400 
the effects of settlement shape also depend largely on where the fire starts and the wind 401 
direction. 402 
4.2  Firefighting infrastructure 403 
The risk imposed by infrastructure (or lack thereof) is a result of how effectively the fire 404 
service are able to combat a fire given the resources available to them. GIS analyses could be 405 
useful for quantifying fire service travel time, road access and quality, and fire hydrant 406 
availability. Spatial metrics such as the travel distance of a settlement to the nearest fire 407 
stations, and the average distance of dwellings to their nearest accessible road and fire 408 
hydrant may be helpful quantifiers of risk [35]. However, the true risk must also take into 409 
account that the response of the emergency services can be affected by settlement conditions 410 
and interactions with residents. For example, a quick arrival of the fire service may be 411 
negated if access routes to the fire are blocked and fire hydrants are not serviceable. It is 412 
important for the fire service to be notified immediately when a fire is discovered which 413 
requires correct contact information to be disseminated publicly. However, a recent survey of 414 
one settlement in Cape Town revealed that less than 70% of residents knew an emergency 415 
services contact number and less than 9% knew the direct fire brigade telephone number [36]. 416 
Readers are referred to the work of Kahanji et al. on the Imizamo Yethu fire of 2017 [2] for a 417 
more detailed study into the complex and dynamic scenario faced by the fire service. Overall, 418 
concerning firefighting infrastructure, it is challenging to incorporate purely spatial metrics in 419 
a risk model without considerable further research. 420 
4.3 Environment 421 
4.3.1 Wind 422 
Wind clearly has a dominant role in fire spread. For the Cape Town fire data from 2009-2015 423 
[8], informal settlement fires that took place in winds that were anecdotally described by the 424 
fire service as ‘gale-force’ or ‘strong’ burned an average of 28 dwellings, though with 425 
standard deviations of 65 and 113 respectively, suggesting a very high variability. However, 426 
fires during ‘moderate’ wind or ‘light breeze’ burned only 11 and 4 dwellings on average, 427 
respectively. In the Imizamo Yethu fire of 2017, the wind was strong enough to push the fire 428 
downhill [2], a slope with maximum pitch of approximately 15° [20]. 429 
The effects of wind are complex. At the dwelling level, high winds can delay flashover by 430 
increasing the heat release rate required to initiate it [37].  However, once a fire is fully 431 
developed, wind-assisted through-draft increases both the length of flames projected from 432 
openings and the heat flux imposed upon adjacent dwellings [25]. Local interactions of the 433 
wind with the dwelling surfaces could increase or decrease flame length and must be taken 434 
into account. Furthermore, it is reiterated that fires may develop wildfire-type characteristics, 435 
meaning that as a fire develops so does the effect of wind. In the field of wildfire, the role of 436 
wind has been conceptualised in many ways. Across a variety of studies reviewed by Sullivan 437 
[38], the relationship between wind speed and fire spread rate has been previously modelled 438 
by many different exponential and power functions. Experimentally, it has been shown that 439 
 
 
both flame length and rate of spread of a line fire in a wildfire-type fuel bed increase 440 
exponentially with wind speed [39].  441 
4.3.2 Climate 442 
It is assumed that moisture has some effects on informal settlement fires but it not known 443 
how best to quantify this. It may involve quantification of rainfall or humidity, either of 444 
which are easily done, but the subsequent relation to fire risk has not been established. 445 
Generally, the presence of moisture will vary with seasonal changes in climate, making it 446 
difficult to discern the role of moisture independently given the significance of wind which 447 
also varies in seasonal patterns. 448 
4.3.3 Topography 449 
Flame spread rate is known to increase with fuel orientation (slope angle) but the exact 450 
relationship depends on the context (for basic examples see Drysdale [24]). Experimental 451 
tests suggest there is an approximate linear, but shallow, increase in flame spread rate with 452 
slope angle up to a transitional point where the burning regime changes and flame spread 453 
increases exponentially. This change does not appear to occur at slope gradients below 30% 454 
(16.7°) [40,41], but likely occurs at gradients of approximately 45% (25°) [41]. This is 455 
contextually relevant, given that few of Cape Town’s informal settlements are located on 456 
steep slopes. Using available open source data [20], it was found that none of the informal 457 
settlements have an average slope exceeding 19°. Indeed, the vast majority (92%) have 458 
average slopes of less than 5°. Further work is required, as this analysis assumes that the 459 
informal settlement will act as a fuel bed (like wildfire spread). Currently, it is unknown how 460 
slope affects fire spread in the urban context, particularly in dwelling-to-dwelling 461 
interactions.  462 
There is also the possibility that the effects of topography are negligible in the overall context 463 
of fire spread. In the Imizamo Yethu fire, the wind was dominant in controlling the fire 464 
spread and pushed the fire downslope [2], at an angle of approximately 15° (27% gradient).  465 
4.4 Additional risk 466 
In addition to the risk model, these factors act as sources to exacerbate fire risk. Whilst much 467 
work is still required to understand their effects and incorporate them into a numerical model, 468 
a conceptual framework for understanding their basic function is laid out in Figure 8. Each 469 
additional risk factor contributes to overall risk as a function (as yet undefined) for which the 470 
internal risk is an input. In line with prior discussion (4.1.1-4.3.3), there are clearly instances 471 
where the layout of a settlement determines that there is no additional risk as a result of 472 
particular factors. In simple terms the internal risk defines the starting point for a pathway 473 
through additional risk layers. Three hypothetical examples are given to illustrate this (Figure 474 
8): 475 
1. A fire in an extremely low internal risk settlement. Fire spread from a single dwelling 476 
is very unlikely so the shape of the wider settlement and availability of hydrants are 477 
effectively irrelevant. The effect of wind on compartment fire dynamics and the 478 
length of burn of the initial dwelling due to fuel load may be determining factors in 479 
the fire being able to spread to 1-2 other dwellings at most. 480 
2. A fire in a ‘transitional’ settlement. The outcome of the fire is dependent on all 481 
factors.  A perfect storm of conditions may result in a fire that spreads to tens of 482 
dwelling. Wind plays a role in the initial compartment fire dynamics but also 483 
subsequent fire spread as a flame front develops. 484 
3. A fire in a very high internal risk settlement. Left to its own devices, this fire will 485 
naturally develop into a wildfire-type conflagration. Dwellings are in such close 486 
 
 
proximity to one another that a) the effects of wind on individual compartment fire 487 
dynamics have a negligible influence on the rate of spread, b) the interaction of the 488 
wind with the fire will be in a manner similar to wildfire dynamics, and c) the fuel 489 
load in dwellings is irrelevant since the fire spread vastly outpaces dwelling burnout 490 
time regardless of low fuel loads. 491 
 492 
Figure 8: Conceptual framework for additional levels of fire risk, where the pathway of risk is determined by a point of 493 
origin relative to the conditions of settlement layout 494 
The upper and lower operating limits of a factor’s function in the framework are simply for 495 
illustration and do not represent exact limits. They are merely to show the concept that they 496 
remain relevant only to a point, depending on the layout of dwellings. There are three factors 497 
deemed to effect all fires regardless of internal risk: topography, building materials and fire 498 
service functionality. At this stage it is safest to assume they play a role in all fires as their 499 
effects are difficult to quantify cleanly, if at all. Overall, it is hypothesised that, where 500 
internal risk quantifies the ability of a settlement to develop a large fire, additional risk 501 
factors are what result in the large variability in historical fire size in high risk settlement 502 
(refer to Table 1). 503 
4.5 Fire risk development with time 504 
4.5.1 Settlement layout 505 
Clearly, this analysis, in which multiple factors can have highly-varying effects on the 506 
outcome of a fire, presents issues. It implies there is no one-size-fits-all solution to tackling 507 
the issue of fires. However, given the settlement layout can be identified as being significant 508 
in its own right as well as influencing the effect of additional environmental and 509 
infrastructural factors, it provides a basis for tackling the problem. Consider a hypothetical 510 




Figure 9: Development of fire risk in time for a hypothetical risk model, if settlements are allowed to densify 513 
An obvious concern is that as settlements grow and densify in time, more settlements will 514 
move into transitional and high risk zones. It is therefore proposed that the development of 515 
measures to improve the settlement layout will be critical to inhibiting the development of 516 
large fires. Implementing such measures will likely be tricky given the nature of the problem 517 
– that settlements are already established and wholesale changes to a settlement would 518 
require uprooting many residents. However, the component metrics of the risk model at least 519 
identify some of the fundamental variables by which small changes could result in increases 520 
in safety. For example, the approach developed by Wang et al. [25] that is built into the 521 
concept of critical distance for fire spread in the risk model relies on assuming the such 522 
variables as the type of materials present and the dimension and orientation of windows. If 523 
incremental changes can be made over time which target a settlement’s specific 524 
vulnerabilities, such as identifying and removing materials with low critical heat fluxes and 525 
ensuring that doors and windows are oriented away from neighbouring dwellings, then fire 526 
risk can be reduced. 527 
4.5.2 Firefighting infrastructure 528 
As discussed, the evaluation of fire service response based solely on spatial metrics is 529 
unreliable. However, this does not negate the importance having high-quality, functional 530 
infrastructure. Rather, rigorously maintained infrastructure should provide the basis upon 531 
which the fire service can operate. Over extended periods of time this should include: 532 
 Construction and maintenance of adequate access roads to and within informal 533 
settlements, including monitoring to prevent the occurrence of obstructions to fire 534 
engines, 535 
 Monitoring of fire hydrants to ensure they are functional and accessible within 536 
settlements, 537 
 Dynamic allocation of resources to fire stations to ensure efficient distribution of 538 
firefighting capability relative to the present risk in nearby informal settlements. 539 
Additionally, to ensure an effective and productive relationship between residents and the fire 540 
service, there is a need to provide accessible information on fire safety and clear public 541 
dissemination of the correct emergency service telephone numbers. 542 
 
 
4.5.3 Environment 543 
Given the continuation of global warming, the effects of the environment on informal 544 
settlement fire risk, which are already complex, are unpredictable over long periods of time. 545 
Not only will changing weather patterns alter the probable conditions which will drive the 546 
physical spread of fire, but changes to seasonal temperature variations may impact upon the 547 
actions of residents in heating or cooling their homes. This could include the usage of 548 
different energy sources, possibly resulting in increased fire ignitions, or it could mean 549 
residents start incorporating new, potentially hazardous, building materials into their homes 550 
to cope with new climatic conditions. A simple example might be that a hypothetical increase 551 
in the occurrence of heavy rain showers results in a higher prevalence of residents using 552 
plastic sheeting as waterproofing. There is a great deal of uncertainty into what, when and 553 
how changes will occur, but a pre-emptive understanding of the impact of climate conditions 554 
on fire should contribute to risk mitigation strategies that can respond quickly to future 555 
climate changes.    556 
5 Conclusions 557 
The layout of informal settlements are critical in determining the settlement’s ability to 558 
develop large-scale fire spread. Metrics to establish this criticality have been proposed, taking 559 
into account the fundamental ability of a fire to spread quickly, in multiple directions, and to 560 
a sufficiently large extent. However, it is suggested more work is needed to refine these 561 
metrics and better understand how they relate to the physical dynamics of fire spread. For 562 
example, it is not yet known at what size of fire the fire spread behaviour may be more 563 
adequately described as wildfire-type spread. Future work could take the form of 564 
experiments, computational modelling or a combination of the two, and needs to aim at 565 
developing knowledge of the fundamental fire spread mechanisms and processes involved in 566 
informal settlement fires. In the interim, the risk model methodology proposed in this paper 567 
provides a quick method for establishing the highest priority settlements for fire risk 568 
mitigation strategies across a set of settlements (regional or citywide).  569 
Yet, the layout of a settlement does not independently determine the outcome of a fire. 570 
Additional risk factors, in unfortunate combinations, can contribute to the destruction of 571 
hundreds or thousands of homes in a single fire – particularly in instances of high winds. The 572 
variety of different risk factors establishes a need for an integrated approach to tackling the 573 
issue of informal settlement fires. The baseline risk posed by the settlement layout requires a 574 
great deal of physical engineering to prevent the establishing of large fires, but this alone 575 
cannot completely solve the problem. Both within and outside of settlements, the 576 
management and maintenance of wider firefighting infrastructure is required. Beyond the 577 
physical urban environment, sociological solutions are also required. This could include 578 
educating residents about best practice to prevent ignitions, and fostering good relationships 579 
with the fire service so residents are compliant and not problematic in fire scenarios. 580 
Generally, it should not be forgotten that the problem of fire is a result of the background of 581 
socio-economic deprivation, which must be combatted holistically and cannot be treated 582 
solely as an engineering issue. The engagement of policymakers with all types of expertise is 583 
therefore vital in progressing towards the most effective solutions. The provision of risk 584 
quantification methods for the use of policymakers should represent a foundation upon which 585 
they can engage with the issue. 586 
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